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Why the Obama Administration needs a new platform for the U.S. 
diplomatic strategy to counter North Korea’s brinkmanship 
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Introduction 
Was Pyongyang’s launch of a long-range missile on April 5, 2009, regardless of whether it was a 
rocket carrying a communication satellite or an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), a 
shocking event? It surely appeared a shock to the public, but Washington shouldn’t have been 
taken aback by it. If the Obama Administration already perceives how the two prior 
Administrations mistakenly dealt with North Korea’s provocative actions, then this event should 
come as no surprise at all. If not however, the Obama Administration could repeat the same 
mistakes as the Clinton and Bush Administrations. 
At this time, the Obama Administration should first understand the nature of North Korea’s 
brinkmanship. From past events, the North’s actions have shown a dual-cyclical pattern of certain 
steps: tension, negotiation, demand, delay negotiation, receive reward, then repeating the same 
cycle. 
 
From this perspective, North Korea’s brinkmanship always succeeds in igniting tension in the 
international community, and at the same time becomes a useful tactic to pursue rewards in 
exchange for the acceptance of the U.S.-North Korea agreements. However, these agreements 
have been the only way for Pyongyang to earn sufficient time for achieving its ambitions: in the 
final analysis, Kim’s regime views nuclear weapons and a long-range missile program as a 
necessity. 
In 1993, when North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), tension on 
the Korean Peninsula escalated rapidly. Washington and Pyongyang, however, soon resumed 
the talks and drew up the 1994 Agreed Framework, which rewarded the North in various ways. 
However, North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006, verified by the U.S. as a successful 
test. Eventually, the North found it had only gains without incurring any loss. 
An even worse crisis was the 1998 Taepo Dong-1 missile launch, although North Korea claimed it 
was a civilian satellite. It is apparent that Pyongyang strategically employed a dual cyclical pattern 
to achieve its two ambitions. While Washington and Pyongyang were negotiating the agreements, 
including the complete shutdown of its nuclear program, another ambition of the North, to obtain 
long-range missile technology, raised tensions and forced Washington and Seoul to accept 
Pyongyang’s demands in exchange for giving up its nuclear program. 
 
Strategically, Pyongyang was attempting to minimize the negative repercussions of another 
provocative action by characterizing the missile launch as a civilian satellite. At the same time, 
North Korea also calculated that China and Russia could use this obfuscation to prevent a strong 
U.N. Security Council response. As a result, its provocative actions moved along to the "Delay 
negotiation" stage, where again the North would enjoy much time to achieve its ambitions 
covertly. 
So what should the Obama Administration do about this recent North Korean ballistic missile 
launch, and its subsequent second succesful nuclear test? Should his Administration keep 
appealing to the U.N Security Council to draw a hard-line stance? Should it restart the Six Party 
Talks aimed at ending North Korea’s ambitions? These options may eventually be necessary for 
President Obama to decide in order to deal with the North’s action; but his Administration first 
needs to reshape its strategy to counter North Korea’s brinkmanship before determining whether 
the two existing options synchronize with his options or not. 
Then how is the U.S. strategy to be reshaped? First, what the Bush Administration had 
mistakenly responded to the North’s Highly-Enriched-Uranium (HEU) program at the very early 
stage of negotiations with a hasty decision to harden its stance against talking with Pyongyang 
although most U.S. allies were encouraging a diplomatic solution. If the Bush Administration had 
expected the North would not take any further provocative action if its regime felt secure—even 
as North Korea’s ambitions slowly advanced. In other words, Bush’s strong rhetoric was 
perceived by Pyongyang as a big chance to speed up its HEU program. Pyongyang might have 
waited to take the chance because it already had an insight into the Bush Administration's foreign 
policy. Thus, the current Administration should not stir up Kim’s regime so as to slacken its 
ambitions. 
Second, consider the adage, "We know less about you, but you do not know what we know." In 
the late 1990s, the Clinton Administration knew that North Korea had imported suspicious items 
that could be used for a HEU program. But that had not been revealed to the public until October 
2002. The revelation thus killed the 1994 Agreed Framework, and the North re-opened its 
plutonium production facilities. Although the revelation of such evidence can be necessary to 
obtain public support for taking action, the timing of a such a revelation is very important. What if 
Washington’s evidence at that time had not been shown to the public? Even if there was never be 
a true end to the North’s nuclear ambitions, at least its successful 2006 nuclear test would not 
have so suddenly occured. As mentioned above, the "Delay negotiation" stage of the dual-cyclical 
pattern is a critical period during which North Korea can earn some extra time to advance its 
program. 
Third, President Obama should have a serious dialogue with Russia and China about dealing 
with Kim’s regime, while he continues to extend the hand of negotiation to Pyongyang. As such, 
the 2006 nuclear test and the more recent missile launch and second nuclear test reveal how 
Russia and China respond to the North’s actions. These two powerful nations will play a crucial 
role in dealing with the North’s further actions. 
All these considerations should help the United States implement a new diplomatic strategy to 
counter North Korea’s brinkmanship. Its ambitions are not likely "magic flowers." Kim’s regime 
would also not expect that its goals will be achieved by magic. His regime’s "secrecy" and "cruel 
internal pressure" on North Koreans only create tensions in the world. We thus need break down 
these two ingredients in North Korea’s use of brinkmanship. 
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